List of Polish Military Aid to Ukraine

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Aid to Ukrainian Refugees

Following the 2014–2015 Russian military intervention in Ukraine, including its annexation of Crimea (“Helsinki Declaration”), the situation changed dramatically. Poland began taking in large numbers of refugees from the Russo-Ukrainian War as part of the EU’s refugee program. The policy of strategic partnership between Kyiv and Warsaw was extended to military and technical cooperation, but the more immediate task, informed Poland’s State secretary Krzysztof Szczerski, was Ukraine’s constitutional reform leading to broad decentralization of power. The number of applications for refugee status rose 50 times following the start of War in Donbas in 2014. At the time most applicants were not eligible to claim refugee protection in Poland, because Ukraine as a sovereign country with a democratic government remained fully accountable to its citizens. While the conflict remained frozen until 2022, resident visas in Poland were available in other immigration categories. After the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine newly arriving refugees may apply under the standard EU asylum procedure or receive emergency temporary protection.

In 2022, Poland took in almost 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees. The migration resulted in a 50% rise in the population of Rzeszów, the largest city in south-eastern Poland. Warsaw’s population increased by 15%, Kraków’s by 23%, and Gdańsk’s by 34%. Ukrainian refugees have the legal right to reside and work across the European Union. They are also entitled to the same benefits as Poles, including health insurance, free public education, and child allowance. Before the war, the presence of Ukrainians on the Polish labor market was significant. It has been presumed that employing several hundred thousand more people should not be a problem (this is already partially corroborated by the fact that nearly 150,000 newly arrived war refugees have entered the Polish labor market). However, such an outlook can be overly optimistic.

The recent influx consists primarily of women with children, whereas prior to the war, Ukrainians in Poland were predominantly employed in male-dominated occupations. Thus, there may be disparities between the available talents and the requirements of the labor market. This will necessitate a very high level of training and retraining opportunities tailored to the Ukrainian professional profile. Additional measures will be required to prevent threats such as workplace exploitation, abuse, and sexual harassment, which are to be expected given the magnitude of the phenomenon and the limited bargaining power of war refugees.

In the short term, due to the uniqueness of the situation, tensions can be easily avoided, but they are expected to emerge in the medium and long term. Especially people using public services may experience a deterioration in the standard of living due to the presence of war refugees who will also be entitled to state support. A similar situation may also take place in the labor market, with possible adverse effects, particularly on the local scale. These risks should be identified, monitored and addressed through well-tailored public policies, including communication campaigns.

Less than a month after the invasion, the Polish government established the Aid Fund, run by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, which funds all actions and programs aimed at assisting and integrating Ukrainian refugees.

In January 2025, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk supported proposals to reduce benefits for Ukrainian refugees in Poland. From 1 July 2026, Ukrainian refugees, including the elderly, were no longer provided with free refugee accommodation to encourage Ukrainians to return home after four years of support, or to support themselves financially. The cost of the support has been estimated at 40 billion złoty (£8 billion).

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